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The role of public subsidies on farms’ managerial efficiency: An application of a five-
stage approach to France 
Abstract 
This paper applies a five-step approach to the investigation of the relationship between public 
subsidies, namely CAP direct payments, and managerial efficiency for French COP and beef 
farms in 2000. Managerial efficiency scores are calculated using a four-step approach that 
allows disentangling managerial inefficiency from unfavourable external conditions. Then, in 
a fifth stage, managerial efficiency scores are regressed over a set of explanatory variables, 
including CAP direct payments. Using individual farm data and meteorological data at the 
municipality level, we show that there is a non negligible component of inefficiency that is 
due to unfavourable conditions, and there is a strong significant negative relationship between 
managerial efficiency and CAP direct payments. 
Keywords: technical efficiency, managerial efficiency, direct payments, farms, France 
JEL Classification: D24, Q12 
 
 
Le rôle des subventions publiques sur l’efficacité managériale des exploitations 
agricoles : Application d’une approche en cinq étapes à la France  
Résumé 
Nous appliquons une approche en cinq étapes à l’analyse de la relation entre les subventions 
agricoles,  en  particulier  les  aides  directes  de  la  PAC,  et  l’efficacité  managériale  des 
exploitations agricoles françaises spécialisées en céréales et oléo-protéagineux et en viande 
bovine en 2000. Les scores d’efficacité managériale sont calculés avec une approche à quatre 
étapes, qui permet de séparer l’inefficacité managériale des conditions externes défavorables. 
Puis, dans une cinquième étape, les scores d’efficacité managériale sont régressés sur des 
variables  explicatives,  dont  les  aides  directes  de  la  PAC.  En  utilisant  des  données 
individuelles  d’exploitations  et  des  données  météorologiques  au  niveau  communal,  nous 
montrons qu’une part non-négligeable d’inefficacité est due à des conditions défavorables, et 
qu’il y a une forte relation négative entre l’efficacité managériale et les aides directes PAC. 
Mots-clefs :  efficacité  technique,  efficacité  managériale,  aides  directes,  exploitations 
agricoles, France 
Classification JEL : D24, Q12 Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-05 
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The role of public subsidies on farms’ managerial efficiency: An application of a five-
stage approach to France 
 
1.  Introduction 
Farms’ technical efficiency, as a component of competitiveness, has been the subject of great 
research  interest.  Several  studies  have  investigated  whether  farms  could  improve  their 
technical  efficiency,  that  is  to  say  whether  they  could  make  better  use  of  the  existing 
technology by increasing their produced output ceteris paribus (or by decreasing their input 
use ceteris paribus). Once technical efficiency scores have been measured, some studies focus 
on the comparison of several types of farms, such as crop and livestock farms, conventional 
and organic farms, or corporate and individual farms (e.g. Brada and King, 1993; Thiele and 
Brodersen, 1999; Mathijs and Swinnen, 2001; Tzouvelekas et al., 2001; Oude Lansink et al., 
2002; Latruffe et al., 2005), or on the investigation of the sources of technical efficiency (e.g. 
Hallam  and  Machado,  1996;  Abdulai  and  Eberlin,  2001;  Wilson  et  al.,  2001;  Helfand  et 
Levine,  2004;  Latruffe  et  al.,  2004;  Chavas  et  al.,  2005;  Davidova  and  Latruffe,  2007). 
Among the determinants of technical efficiency, a large attention has been given to farms’ 
characteristics (such as size, technology, indebtedness, etc) and to the human capital available 
on farm (such as manager’s age and education, the importance of hired workforce, etc). 
Very little concern has however been given to the role of public subsidies on farms’ technical 
efficiency, in spite of the fact that farmers in Western countries have for long been highly 
subsidised.  While  initially  subsidisation  was  a  way  of  boosting  post-war  agriculture  and 
achieving  food  self-sufficiency,  public  support  has  started  to  be  questioned  in  the  80’s. 
Overproduction, and an increase of the burden on taxpayers and food consumers, were the 
main arguments behind disapprovals. Another claim against agricultural support is that public 
subsidies  may  have  reduced  farm  performance.  Empirical  investigation  of  this  issue  is 
however very recent, and economic theory provides relatively few guidelines on the shape of 
this relationship. 
Within the existing literature, one may find however some theoretical results regarding the 
impact of various support policies on farm technical efficiency at the ‘extensive margin’. In a 
model with free entry and exit, Leathers (1992) and Guyomard et al. (2001) show that direct 
aids to farmers are likely to negatively affect the average technical efficiency of the farming 
sector as  a whole by  allowing relatively less efficient farms to stay in  business.  In these Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-05 
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models  however,  the  technical  efficiency  of  a  given  farm  is  modelled  as  an  exogenous 
variable  entering  the  production,  cost  or  profit  function.  As  a  result,  this  kind  of  studies 
cannot account for the potential impact of farm subsidies on the technical efficiency of each 
farm (i.e., at the ‘intensive margin’). By contrast, Bergström (2000) argues that subsidies can 
have a negative impact on technical efficiency for at least two reasons. First, higher profits 
weaken managers’ motivation in the form of slack or lack of effort. Second, subsidies can 
help  managers  to  avoid  bankruptcy  and  postpone  activity  reorganisation  and  performance 
improving.  The  same  idea  arises  from  the  model  proposed  by  Martin  and  Page  (1983). 
Following  Bergsman  (1974)  and  Balassa  (1975),  arguing  that  protection  increases 
inefficiency, and building on work by Corden (1970) and Martin (1978) showing how to 
model inefficiency effects, Martin and Page develop an analytical framework where each 
firm’s  owner-manager  maximizes  his  utility  that  depends  positively  on  firm’s  profits  and 
negatively on his own work time. The production function, in addition to usual arguments, is 
specified as an increasing function of efficiency. Efficiency is modelled as a positive function 
of available information stock and total management effort, i.e., the management effort by the 
manager himself and the “management effort” bought on the market at a given price. Within 
this modelling framework, Martin and Page show that direct aids have a negative impact on 
the manager’s work time, on total management effort and finally on efficiency. Empirical 
results based on cross-section data from a survey of firms in Ghana’s logging and sawmilling 
industries  confirm  this  negative  relationship  between  direct  aids  and  firms’  efficiency. 
Regarding  agriculture,  a  few  empirical  studies  confirm  the  negative  relationship  between 
public  subsidies  and  efficiency,  in  the  Western  EU  countries  (e.g  Rezitis  et  al.,  2003; 
Emvalomatis et al., 2008; Zhu et al., 2008), in Northern America America (e.g. Giannakas et 
al., 2001; Serra et al., 2008), or in the EU New Member States (e.g. Bakucs et al., 2007; 
Bojnec and Latruffe, 2009). 
However, these agricultural studies consider the overall technical efficiency of farms, while 
the notion of efficiency upon which the Martin and Page’s (1983) model is built on, as well as 
the first reason invoked by Bergström (2000) for an expected negative relationship between 
subsidies and efficiency, rather relate to managerial efficiency only. Managerial efficiency 
indeed represents the ability and the effort of farmers-managers. It is thus a more suitable 
variable on which subsidies may impact relative to other inefficiency components, notably 
those related to the farms’ external conditions. External conditions refer to the environment 
where farmers operate and on which they have little, if not zero, control. In particular, climate Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-05 
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and  soil  characteristics  heavily  influence  farmers’  production  and  performance  but  little 
except irrigation and fertilisation can be done to improve bad natural conditions. The majority 
of studies dealing with the sources of farms’ technical inefficiency have included localisation 
variables  or  soil  characteristics  among  the  inefficiency  determinants  (e.g.  Hallam  and 
Machado, 1996; Liu and Zhuang 2000; Latruffe et al., 2004; Davidova and Latruffe, 2007; 
Mahadevan, 2008) in order to investigate the impact of farms’ localisation conditions on their 
performance.  In  this  study,  however,  we  attempt  to  precisely  measure  farms’  managerial 
efficiency scores in order to assess the impact of public subsidies on them. For this reason, we 
use the four-step approach initially developed by Fried et al. (1999) in so far as this approach 
seeks to disentangle managerial inefficiency from other technical inefficiency components, 
notably  what  is  due  to  unfavourable  external  conditions.  The  calculation  of  managerial 
efficiency scores, although common in service sectors such as banks, hospitals and education 
(Drake et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2006; Wang and Huang, 2007; Cordero-Ferrera et al., 2008), 
has, to our knowledge, never been done in agriculture. We combine Fried et al.’s (1999) four-
step approach with the traditional two-stage approach in non-parametric efficiency calculation 
(the  first  stage  being  the  calculation  of  efficiency  scores  and  the  second  stage  being  the 
regression of these scores on several determinants): our analysis is therefore performed in a 
five-step framework. 
This analytical framework is applied to a sample of French farms in 2000 and will allow us to 
analyse to what extent direct payments of EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) influence 
the managerial efficiency of cereal, oilseeds and proteinseeds (COP) and beef farmers. These 
two types of farms are the most supported by the CAP, and are therefore relevant for the 
investigation. 
The paper is organised as follows. We first describe the five-step approach that has been 
implemented. In the following two sections, we present the empirical model and data, and the 
results. The paper ends with some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  The five-stage methodology 
The  Data  Envelopment  Analysis  (DEA)  approach  is  used  to  measure  technical  efficiency 
(Charnes et al., 1978). This non-parametric method presents the advantages of not relying on 
a particular functional form for the frontier and of considering several outputs and inputs 
simultaneously.  As  mentioned  above,  studies  using  DEA  for  investigating  the  effects  of Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-05 
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explanatory  factors  on  technical  efficiency  resort  to  a  two-stage  approach  in  which  the 
technical efficiency scores calculated with DEA in a first stage are regressed over the set of 
retained factors in a second stage. As our objective in this study is to investigate the impact of 
CAP direct payments on French farms’ managerial efficiency, we use the four-stage approach 
proposed by Fried et al. (1999) that allows adjusting the technical efficiency scores for the 
operating  environment  and  extracting  managerial  efficiency,  followed  by  a  regression  of 
managerial efficiency scores. 
Fried et al.’s (1999) procedure is proposed for an input-orientated framework. In the first 
stage, technical efficiency (TE) is estimated with DEA including standard inputs and outputs. 
This gives, for each observation (i.e., each firm or farm), the total potential reduction of each 
input  calculated  as  the  radial  reduction  given  by  the  efficiency  score  plus  the  non  radial 
reduction given by input slacks. In the second stage, the total potential reduction for each 
input  is  regressed  over  a  set  of  variables  characterizing  the  operating  environment.  The 
predicted input reductions are then used to adjust the primary input data in a third stage. 
Finally, in a fourth stage, new technical efficiency scores are calculated again using DEA but 
with the adjusted inputs. This stage provides the managerial efficiency, that is to say the 
technical efficiency disentangled from external conditions. In this paper, we adapt the Fried et 
al.’s (1999) four-stage procedure to the output-orientated framework: we consider that this 
framework  is  more  suitable  for  the  French  farms  considered  (specialised  in  COP  and 
specialised in beef), as they are not constrained in their output expansion. The five stages of 
the approach are defined as follows. 
 
2.1.  First  stage:  calculation  of  technical  efficiency  and  total  potential  output 
augmentations 
DEA uses linear programming to construct the efficient frontier with the best performing 
farms of the sample so that all farms lie on or below the frontier.  In the output-oriented 
framework, distance from a farm to the frontier on its output-ratio ray represents the extent of 
its radial (i.e. proportional) potential output augmentation; this distance defines the technical 
efficiency  score.  But  a  firm  may  also  have  the  potential  to  augment  further  some  of  its 
outputs: ‘radial’ efficiency increase does not exhaust improvement possibilities as firms may 
also extend output ‘non radially’. Such non-radial output augmentations, also called slacks, 
are inherent to the DEA method. The distinction between radial and non-radial proportions is Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-05 
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explained on Figure 1 in the two output case  (Y1 and Y2), ABCD is the efficient frontier 
constructed with DEA. Point F represents a non-efficient farm. Its projection on the frontier 
along the output-ratio is E. Its efficiency score is thus OF/OE calculated as the radial potential 
augmentation of each output that the farm could implement without changing its input use. 
Additionally, farm F could increase its first output Y1 by EB and still use the same quantities 
of inputs. Distance EB represents (in absolute value) the non-radial potential augmentation of 
the first output. 
 
Figure  1:  Illustration  of  radial  (distance  FE)  and  non-radial  (distance  EB)  output 











Running several linear programming models gives for each farm, firstly the output-oriented 
technical efficiency score, and secondly the non-radial potential augmentation for each output. 
For each output and each farm, the total potential augmentation is then calculated as: 
( ) , , 1 *100 i k i i k OTA TE NRA = - +   (1) 
where OTAi,k is the i-th farm total potential augmentation of output k, TEi is the i-th farm’s 
output-oriented technical efficiency score (in the output-orientation model, this score is equal 
to 1 for efficient farms; the less efficient a farm, the greater than 1 its score is) and NRAi,k is 
the i-th farm’s non-radial potential augmentation of output k expressed as a percentage of the 
initial output level. 
 
F 




Y1  O Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-05 
 
  8 
2.2.  Second  stage:  regression  of  each  output  total  potential  augmentation  on 
environmental variables 
A total of K equations are estimated, where K is the number of outputs. For the k-th output, 
the equation to estimate is: 
( ) k i k i k i u Z g OTA , , , + =         for i = 1,…,N farms  (2) 
where Zi,k is a vector of environmental variables for the k-th output, g is a function and ui,k is 
the error term. 
The predicted total augmentation of the k-th output,  , ˆ
i k OTA , represents the output loss that can 
be attributed to the external environment. 
 
2.3.  Third stage: adjustment of primary output levels 
The predicted output total augmentations are then used to adjust the primary output data. The 
adjustment is realised using a base for comparison. The base we retained corresponds to the 
most  favourable  external  conditions:  for  a  farm  operating  in  the  best  environment,  the 
adjusted output is thus equal to the initial output; for the other farms, the adjustment formula 
increases the initial levels of outputs as the underlying assumption is to compensate the farm 
that  produces  proportionally  less  output  because  it  operates  in  an  unfavourable  external 
environment. Therefore, the primary output data are adjusted using the difference between the 
predicted total augmentation in outputs for the farm considered and the minimum predicted 
total augmentation in the sample. For the k-th output, the computation is as follows: 
( ) , , , , ˆ ˆ min
adj
i k i k i k j k Y Y OTA OTA   = + -  
       for i, j  = 1,…,N farms  (3) 
with 
adj
k i Y ,  the adjusted k-th output and Yi,k the k-th primary output of the i-th farm. 
 
2.4.  Fourth and fifth stages: calculation of the managerial efficiency and analysis 
of the impact of CAP direct payments 
The  adjusted  outputs  are  finally  used  in  a  second  DEA  linear  programming  model.  The 
technical efficiency scores obtained can be interpreted as measures of managerial efficiency. 
The  managerial  efficiency  scores  are  regressed  over  a  set  of  variables  that  are  not 
characteristics of the environment. These explanatory variables include CAP direct payments. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-05 
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3.  Data and empirical model 
Data are extracted from the French Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) for the year 
2000 for farms specialised in COP production (European Type of Farming 13) and farms 
specialised in beef production (European Type of Farming 42). The FADN database contains 
detailed  bookkeeping  information  at  the  farm  level.  After  cleaning  for  missing  and 
inconsistent data, the sample sizes are 1,407 for COP farms and 562 for beef farms. 
It is assumed that COP farms and beef farms do not use the same production technology, and 
therefore  two  DEA  frontiers  (one  for  each  farm-type  sample)  are  constructed.  Technical 
efficiency is calculated with a multi-output multi-input DEA model under variable returns to 
scale. Two aggregate outputs are considered for both types of farms: crop output and livestock 
output. Four inputs are  distinguished for COP farms, that is agricultural area in hectares, 
labour in Annual Working Units (AWU), the depreciated value of total assets for the capital 
factor, and intermediate inputs. The same inputs are used for beef farms, with total livestock 
units as an additional input. Table 1 displays descriptive characteristics for outputs and inputs 
used in the first DEA model. Input data are identical in the second DEA model while output 
data are initial data adjusted for accounting for environmental conditions. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-05 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the data used for the first DEA model (first stage) 




















































































Notes: One AWU is equivalent to 2,200 hours of labour per year. Livestock units are calculated with the standard European FADN coefficients. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-05 
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Unfortunately the FADN database does not provide detailed information about the specific 
operating environment facing each farm. However, meteorological data from Météo France 
were available for the year considered at the municipality level. They include, as averages in 
the municipality where the farm operates, altitude, slope, minimal and maximal temperatures, 
rain level, evaporation, sunshine period and the water stock capacity. Additional FADN data 
also proxying the environmental conditions where the farm operates were included: regional 
dummies (at the EU nomenclature level of NUTS2), two dummies indicating whether the 
farm is situated in Less Favoured Area (LFA) and whether in mountainous LFA, respectively, 
and the value of subsidies received for farms situated in remote mountainous areas and for 
farms that have experienced a natural disaster in 2000. It is expected that these Météo France 
and FADN variables characterise the main features of the operating environment faced by 
farms, notably climate conditions. 
Finally, managerial efficiency scores obtained from the second DEA model are regressed over 
a set of explanatory variables, including CAP direct payments. This second set of explanatory 
variables  excludes  the  variables  that  were  used  for  adjusting  output  levels  because  of 
heterogeneous external conditions. In a general way, variables used in this final step and that 
are considered as main determinants of managerial efficiency, are chosen on the basis of past 
empirical studies and intuition as there is no unified theoretical framework upon which this 
selection could rely. Several groups of variables are commonly considered in the literature: 
human  capital  variables,  farm  characteristics,  farm  technology,  and  on-  and  off-farm 
structural factors (such as security of land ownership rights, farms’ financial situation, credit 
access,  institutional  environment,  etc.).  We  retained  two  human  capital  variables,  the 
managers’ age and whether they have a university education (dummy equal to 1). To proxy 
the farm legal status, a dummy equal to 1 if the farm is of individual type was included (other 
statuses include mainly various forms of partnership). Regarding the technology employed, 
the following variables were selected: the share of rented land in total utilised area, the share 
of hired labour in total farm labour, the capital to labour ratio and the land to labour ratio. The 
debt to asset level was also included to represent the use of external financing. Finally, the 
CAP direct payments received by the farm were considered. Such payments include area-
based  payments  (crop  and  set-aside  payments),  headage  premiums  for  livestock,  LFA 
payments and agri-environmental aids. Various measures of CAP payments were included in 
separate regressions: the total amount of CAP payments received by farms (Regression 1); the Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-05 
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amount of all CAP payments per total value of output produced (Regression 2); the amount of 
all CAP payments per hectare of utilised agricultural area for COP farms or per livestock unit 
for livestock farms (Regression 3); and finally the four components of CAP payments all per 
hectare,  except  for  headage  premiums  that  were  included  per  livestock  unit  for  livestock 
farms only
1 (Regression 4). Thus, four regressions are estimated for each sample. Table 2 
reports  descriptive  statistics  for  the  CAP  direct  payments  received  by  the  COP  and  beef 
samples. On average, COP farms received more CAP direct payments than beef farms in 2000 
as a total amount per farm; however, the amount received by both types of farms was fairly 
similar when defined as a ratio of the value of total output produced (around 0.5 on average) 
or in euros per hectare of utilised agricultural area (around 340 euros/ha on average). As 
expected, COP farms received mainly area-based payments and beef farms mainly headage 
premiums. COP farms did not benefit from LFA or agri-environmental payments. 
                                                            
1 For the COP sample, headage premiums could not be included per livestock unit as a large number of COP farms have no 
livestock units, therefore reducing the sample for the regression.  Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-05 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of CAP direct payments received by farms in the samples used 
  COP farms (1,047 farms)  Beef farms (562 farms) 
  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Min  Max  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Min  Max 




































Amount per hectare of agricultural area (euros) 
All payments 
Area-based payments only 
Headage premiums only 
LFA payments only 

















































Notes: CAP direct payments include area-based payments, headage premiums, LFA payments and agri-environmental aids. For beef farms, headage premiums 
per livestock unit are 194 euros on average, with a minimum of 41 euros and a maximum of 355 euros in the sample. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-05 
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4.  Results 
4.1.  Technical and managerial efficiency 
Descriptive  statistics  of  technical  efficiency  scores  (first  DEA  model;  first  stage)  and  of 
managerial  efficiency  scores  (second  DEA  model;  fourth  stage)  are  given  in  Table  3. 
Conventionally, the inverse of the scores given by the output-orientated models is used (the 
inverse is therefore between 0 and 1, with greater score indicating greater efficiency). As 
expected, the managerial efficiency is greater than the technical efficiency  as it has been 
disentangled from unfavourable environmental effects. On average, there is a non negligible 
difference between managerial efficiency scores and technical efficiency scores: efficiency 
scores are on average higher by 0.07 for COP farms and by 0.09 for beef farms. These figures 
indicate that on average 10 percent (COP farms) and 12 percent (beef farms) of the technical 
inefficiency  are  explained  by  unfavourable  operating  conditions.  Although  managerial 
inefficiency is the main source of technical inefficiency, inefficiency could be significantly 
reduced if the farms could operate in better external conditions. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of technical and managerial efficiency scores 
  Technical efficiency score 
(first stage) 
Managerial efficiency score 
(fourth stage) 


























Note:  For  easy-reading,  these  descriptive  statistics  are  for  the  inverses  of  the  efficiency  scores 
obtained with an output-oriented DEA model (in the output-orientation, scores for efficient farms are 
1, while score for inefficient farms are greater than 1). 
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4.2.  Impact of direct payments on managerial efficiency 
Although by construction the efficiency score distribution is bounded at 1, only a few farms 
are on the frontier (5 percent in the COP sample, 8 percent in the beef sample), and therefore 
a standard Ordinary Least Squares regression was preferred to a limited dependent variable 
regression.  The  dependent  variable  in  our  regression  is  the  inverse  of  the  managerial 
efficiency score obtained with the output-oriented DEA model: it therefore ranges between 0 
and 1, and the higher its value, the higher the efficiency. Table 4 and Table 5 present the 
results of the regressions of the managerial efficiency scores: the full results of Regression 2 
are presented in Table 4, while in Table 5 only the coefficients and significance of the CAP 
payments proxies are reported but for all four regressions (Regressions 1, 2, 3, 4). 
Regarding the effect of subsidies, estimation results show that the amount of CAP direct 
payments per total output has a significant negative impact on managerial efficiency for both 
COP and beef farms (Table 4). This indicates that the higher the share of direct payments in 
total output, the less efficient the farm, conform to the expectations based on previous studies. 
The effect is similar for both samples, with a coefficient of -0.347 and for -0.326 for COP and 
beef farms respectively. These figures show that farms receiving one  euro of CAP direct 
payments for each euro of output produced, would experience a reduction of about 0.33 of 
their  managerial  efficiency  score;  in  other  words,  as  the  average  value  of  CAP  direct 
payments per value of output is 0.5 for both samples, the average managerial efficiencies 
could be increased by 0.165, that is to say up to 0.86 for COP and 0.90 beef farms, if CAP 
direct payments were removed, all other things remaining unchanged. The negative influence 
of CAP direct payments is confirmed when they are entered as an absolute value per farm for 
the COP sample but not for the beef sample for which the effect is not significant (although 
such non-significant effect could be due to the fact that the total amount of payments per farm 
may capture other effects such as a size effect); the negative impact is also found with high 
significance when considering the CAP payments per hectare of land (for COP farms) or per 
livestock unit (for beef farms) (Table 5). When including the four components of the CAP 
payments together, results show that the main First Pillar payments received by the farms 
(area-based payments for COP farms, headage premiums for beef farms) have a negative 
impact, while the other type of First Pillar payments (headage premiums for COP farms, area-
based payments for beef farms) have no significant effect. As for the Second Pillar aids, they 
also have a negative significant influence on French farms’ managerial efficiency, except for 
LFA payments which do not play any significant role on COP farms’ efficiency (Table 5). Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-05 
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Regarding  the  effect  of  other  variables,  human  capital  characteristics  (age  and  education) 
surprisingly  play  no  role  on  French  farms’  managerial  efficiency.  We  tried  various 
educational variables in the model (including variables representing agricultural education), 
but  none  of  them  were  significant.  Individual  farmers  do  not  perform  better  than  those 
farming in partnership. The share of rented land in total land has no significant impact, while 
the  share  of  hired  labour  in  total  labour  has  a  negative  impact  for  COP  farms  but  no 
significant  impact  for  beef  farms.  The  higher  the  capital  to  labour  on  the  farm,  the  less 
efficient a COP farm; the higher the land to labour ratio, the more efficient a COP farm and a 
beef farm. Finally, debts allow COP farms to perform better, may be by allowing them to 
purchase high quality inputs. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-05 
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Table 4: Results of the regression of  managerial efficiency scores  including the total  CAP direct payments per total output value 
(Regression 1) 
  Marginal effects and significance 
for COP farms 
Marginal effects and 
significance for beef farms 
Constant 
Age 
Dummy = 1 if university education 
Dummy = 1 if individual farm status 
Share of rented land 
Share of hired labour 
Capital to labour ratio 
Land to labour ratio 
Debt to asset ratio 






-0.912 E-03 *** 
-2.99 E-07 *** 



















Notes: the dependent variables are the inverses of the efficiency scores obtained with an output-oriented DEA model (the dependent variables are therefore 
between 0 and 1, with greater score indicating greater efficiency).*, **, *** denotes significance at 10, 5, 1 percent level. E-n means x10
–n. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-05 
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Table 5: Results of the separate regressions of managerial efficiency including various CAP direct payments in turn 
  Marginal effects and significance 
for COP farms 
Marginal effects and significance 
for beef farms 
Regression 1 
Total CAP direct payments per farm 
 










Total CAP direct payments per hectare of land 











Headage  payments  per  hectare  of  land  (COP 
farms) or per livestock unit (livestock farms) 
0.00018  -0.00034 *** 
LFA payments per hectare of land  -0.00182  -0.00042 ** 
Agri-environmental payments per hectare of land  -0.00093 **  -0.00047 * 
Notes: *, **, *** denotes significance at 10, 5, 1 percent level. E-n means x10
–n. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-05 
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5.  Concluding remarks 
This paper applied a five-step approach to the investigation of the relationship between public 
subsidies, namely CAP direct payments, and managerial efficiency for French COP and beef 
farms in 2000. Managerial efficiency scores were calculated using the four-step approach 
initially  developed  by  Fried  et  al.  (1999).  This  approach  allows  disentangling  managerial 
inefficiency  from  other  technical  inefficiency  components,  notably  what  is  due  to 
unfavourable environment conditions. Then, in a five stage, managerial efficiency scores were 
regressed over a set of explanatory variables, including the CAP direct payments. 
Two  main  findings  emerge.  First,  using  meteorological  variables  at  the  municipality  to 
characterize  farms’  operating  environment  enabled  to  disentangle  inefficiency  due  to  bad 
external  conditions  from  managerial  inefficiency.  Second,  there  is  a  negative  relationship 
between managerial efficiency and CAP direct payments for both COP and beef farms. This 
indicates that, in these two specialisations, French farms that are more supported are less 
efficient, conform to expectations and to empirical results obtained in other studies. The effect 
is  relatively  strong,  as  managerial  efficiency  scores  in  the  samples  considered  could  be 
increase by 0.165 on average if CAP direct payments were removed, ceteris paribus. 
This paper illustrates the usefulness of a five-stage approach when investigating the impact of 
public support on farms’ performance. The illustration is performed with data for the year 
2000, implying that the negative relationship between managerial efficiency and CAP direct 
payments that has been pointed out for French COP and beef farms holds for direct payments 
that were in force in 2000. Since the 2003 CAP reform however, former area and headage 
payments have been replaced by the so-called single farm payment (SFP), applied for the first 
time in 2006 in France. One important question is therefore whether the negative relationship 
between  managerial  efficiency  and  such  a  more  decoupled  direct  payment  (the  SFP)  still 
holds. An application of the five-stage approach to 2006 and later FADN data corresponding 
to the newly implemented SFP when they are available is thus worth undertaking. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-05 
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